The 1945 Manchurian Strategic Offensive Operation in the Light of New Sources
https://doi.org/10.55105/2687-1440-2023-52-151-173
Abstract
The article focuses on the Manchurian strategic offensive operation of the Red Army against the Japanese troops in Northeast China in August 1945. Its relevance is due to the fact that, over the past decade, researchers have gained access to documents from Russian and Japanese archives that allow a detailed assessment of the nature of actions of both sides. At the initiative of the Imperial Supreme Headquarters, the main command of the Kwantung Army in September 1944 adopted a new operational plan of military operations against the USSR, which, unlike the previous ones, was defensive in nature.
Upon detecting in March – April 1945 the movement of Soviet troops to the Far East, Transbaikalia, and the MPR, in May, the Kwantung Army began preparations to repel the expected offensive of the Red Army. The intelligence agencies of Japan were able to accurately determine the operational plan of the Soviet command to conduct the Manchurian offensive operation and the number of forces allocated to this, but they were wrong by a month with the timing of the likely offensive of the Red Army.
Despite problems with supplying the troops with equipment, primarily with weapons and armored vehicles, the Kwantung army, due to the mobilization of Japanese reservists living in Manchuria and the replenishment of troops with units and formations from Northern China and Korea, faced the offensive of Soviet troops from three directions in an organized manner. During the fierce fighting, the Japanese troops maintained stable control and, adhering to the pre-war plan, retreated to the previously prepared defense lines. Until the top command of the Kwantung Army ordered its subordinate units to cease hostilities on August 16, 1945, the troops generally retained their combat capability. In this regard, further in-depth research of the strengths and weaknesses of the Manchurian strategic offensive operation is required to use its experience in military pedagogical and historiographical practice.
About the Author
A. G. ZorikhinRussian Federation
Zorikhin Aleksandr Gennad’evich, PhD, independent researcher
Komsomolsk-on-Amur
References
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Review
For citations:
Zorikhin A.G. The 1945 Manchurian Strategic Offensive Operation in the Light of New Sources. Yearbook Japan. 2023;52(1):151-173. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.55105/2687-1440-2023-52-151-173